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Changing Money: Foreign Exchange
Reform in the People's Republic of
China
By LARRY L. DRUMM*
"You can't buy those grapefruit. But if you change money, I'll
give them to you."'
I. Introduction
Westerners who have been to the People's Republic of China
(also referred to as the PRC or China) should be familiar with the
uncanny ability of some Chinese to pronounce the English words
"change money." Only foreign investors in China, however, have felt
the pinch of these words. This pinch results from the pervasive con-
trols the PRC has placed on foreign exchange.
China itself, however, has recently "changed its money" in a fun-
damental way. The State Council's decision on further reforms of
China's foreign exchange system2 (the Foreign Exchange Reforms)
represents a move of substantial importance to investors because it
remedies a discriminatory exchange rate system and will affect the ad-
ministration of enterprises in China. This Note provides an overview
of the PRC's foreign exchange system before and after the reforms,
with special attention to the problems of foreign direct investment. It
is maintained that, unlike the 1986-87 foreign exchange provisions
designed to help investors, the goal behind the current reforms is to
* Member of the Class of 1996; A.B., University of California, Berkeley, 1991. Spe-
cial thanks to Jay C. Clemens, Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Has-
tings College of the Law, for his valuable suggestions.
1. Amanda Bennett, As Peking Wrestles with Devaluation, Currency Black Market
Dealers Thrive, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1984, at 32 (statement of Chinese fruit vendor to an
Australian student).
2. The regulations were officially announced by the People's Bank of China on Jan. 1,
1994. A translation of the announcement was printed in English in the Business Weekly
Supplement to China's official English language newspaper, China Daily. China: Central
Bank's New Reforms of Foreign Exchange System, CHINA DArLY, in Bus. Wy., Jan. 16,
1994 (China Daily Supp.), available in WL, Int-News-C Database [hereinafter Foreign Ex-
change Reforms].
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reestablish central control over the foreign exchange flows of various
domestic business entities and regions.
To help appreciate the impact of the Foreign Exchange Reforms,
Part II of this Note follows the Chinese currency from a paradigm of
central control at the founding of the People's Republic to its splinter-
ing into three separate exchange rates and markets thirty years later.
In tandem, it examines the development of foreign direct investment3
in China and the PRC's attempts to address investors' complaints of
foreign exchange difficulties with methods such as swap markets and
import substitution. Part III illustrates that the reform of the foreign
exchange system is an effort to regain central control over unre-
strained capital flows by both state enterprises and provincial govern-
ments, noting the failure of other government expedients taken to
establish such control, save for one exception in stabilizing the cur-
rency. It is argued that this success inspired the Foreign Exchange
Reforms, which are presented and analyzed. The final section con-
cludes with a look back at the effects of the reforms on foreign direct
investment.
II. Previous Foreign Exchange Controls (1949-1993) and
Foreign Direct Investment
The level of foreign direct investment in China has risen dramati-
cally in recent years. An estimated US$110 billion dollars of foreign
investment was contracted in 1993 alone, with over US$25 billion ac-
tually expended.4 These amounts are almost equal to the combined
amounts expended in the preceding fourteen years since the "open
3. Foreign direct investment is active investment in which the investor has a voice, as
distinguished from portfolio investment, which is passive in nature, and involves diversifi-
cation rather than control. PAUL H. VIsHNY, 1 GUIDE TO INTERNA71ONAL COMMERCE
LAW § 5.01 (1993). The foreign direct investment referred to in this Note is generally lim-
ited to three types: equity joint ventures, cooperative (or contractual) joint ventures, and
wholly foreign-owned ventures. Investment in these enterprises is generally referred to by
this author as "foreign direct investment," and these firms collectively referred to as "for-
eign invested" or "foreign funded" enterprises (FIEs or FFEs by commentators).
Following these commentators, this note does not discuss foreign direct investment in
the forms of "representative offices and contract for construction projects, management
services, processing and assembly operations, compensation trade arrangements, leasing of
equipment, and licensing of technology, and ... develop[ment of] offshore and onshore oil
and other mineral resources in China." Jerome A. Cohen & Stuart A. Valentine, Recent
Legislation Assisting Foreign Investors to Solve Their Hard Currency Problem: Import Sub-
stitution and Other Options, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 519, 519 n.2 (1988) [hereinafter Hard
Currency Problem].
4. Foreign Investment in China Increasing Rapidly, Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Ser-
vice, Jan. 28,1994 (quoting Wu Yi, PRC Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Coopera-
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door" reforms were first implemented 5 Meanwhile, the PRC exper-
ienced back-to-back years of thirteen percent overall economic
growth.6
This influx of foreign direct investment is attributable in large
part to China's establishment of a supportive legal framework.7 For
example, Chinese-Foreign joint ventures are given sizeable tax
breaks.8 In addition, the PRC established areas of preferential treat-
ment for foreign direct investments, known as Special Economic
Zones (SEZs) and Economic and Technological Development Zones
(ETDZs), which offer both foreign and domestic investors measurable
preference in taxation, employment, utilities, and other business con-
siderations.9 These areas have served as testing grounds for reforms
of business law and trading practices, including foreign exchange pro-
tion (MOFERT)), available in WL, Int-News Database. These levels represent respective
90% and 134% increases over 1992 levels. Id.
5. Id For a further discussion see infra part II.B.
6. Marcus W. Brauchli, Tempering of Investment Boom in China Signals Return to
Sounder Growth There, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1994, at A12.
7. For a full discussion of the history of and motivations behind foreign direct invest-
ment in China, see Jerome A. Cohen & Stuart J. Valentine, Foreign Direct Investment in
the People's Republic of China: Progress, Problems and Proposals, 1 J. CHMNSE L. 161,
163-78 (1987).
8. Qualifying joint ventures can receive two tax-free years followed by a fifty percent
reduction in the three succeeding years. Id at 16869.
For a more complete discussion of China's tax system see Timothy A. Gelatt & Rich-
ard D. Pomp, China's Tax System: An Overview and Transactional Analysis, in FoREiON
TRADE, INvEmmNr, Am THE LAW iN THm PEoPLE's REPusLc OF CHINA 42 (Michael J.
Moser ed., 2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter FoREIGN TRADE]. Along with the Foreign Exchange
Reforms which are discussed in this Note, the PRC has also made major reforms in its
taxation system that may alter some of the benefits enjoyed by foreign investors in China.
For a discussion of these reforms see Sabine Stricker, China's Tax Reform: Tax Reforms in
China Include One System for Domestic and Foreign Enterprises, 5 J. INr'L TaX'N 117
(1994).
9. Special Economic Zones (jingii tequ in Mandarin Chinese) were first established in
1979 in three municipalities: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong province.
Elison Pow & Michael J. Moser, Law and Investment in China's Special Investment Areas,
in FOREiGN TRADE, supra note 8, at 199.
Economic and Technical Development Zones (ETDZs) are special regions within
other cities and areas that have since been "opened up" but lack full SEZ status. Id. at
234. In ETDZs, investors enjoy comparable preferential treatment to SEZs. Id. However,
ETDZs lack administrative independence and are limited to industries best suited to the
area (SEZs can also engage in other commercial activities). Id.
For a general discussion of both SEZs and ETDZs see Ud at 199-269; Owen D. Nee,
Jr., China's Special Economic Zones and Fourteen Coastal Cities, in LEOAL ASPECTS OF
Dom Busnass WrrH CHINA at 445-88 (1986) (Practicing Law Institute, Course Hand-
book Series No. 405, A4-4173); RAL.PH H. FOLsoM r AL., LAw IN THE PEOPLE'S REPue.
LIC OF CHINA IN A NtrrsHm,, 387-91 (1992).
1995]
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visions.10 However, China's apparent intent to assist foreign investors
does not negate "[t]he complexity of China's foreign exchange [which]
has become one of the greatest challenges for outsiders wishing to do
business in the country.""
A. Stabilization and Central Planning (1949-1978)
1. Birth of the People's Currency
At the birth of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the coun-
try was in a state of economic chaos. 2 To regain control over the
economy, the new central government unified the banking system13 by
establishing a national bank, the People's Bank of China (PBOC),t4
and a national currency.' 5 The currency was named renminbi (literally
the "people's currency" in Mandarin Chinese) with its unit referred to
as the yuan.'6
The central government set national policies,'7 and large district
governments carried out foreign exchange control using their own
10. TWo commentators write:
A... function of the SEZs is to serve as centres for education and experimenta-
tion. Isolated geographically, the SEZs are viewed as "hothouses" of economic
development in which China is able, within a controlled enviroiment, to gain
experience.., with economic reforms that may be adopted elsewhere in China.
Chinese publications have frequently elaborated on this theme describing the
SEZs as pilot projects ....
Pow & Moser, supra note 9, at 201.
11. Harry Sender, 7wo Price China, FAR E. ECON. REv., June 17, 1993, at 64.
12. The economy was in a state of hyperinflation at the fall of th- Nationalist (Kuo-
mintang) regime. Anita Santorum, Country Study: China, 1949.88, in MONETARY POLICY
IN DEVELOPING CoUNTRIES 187 (Sheila Page ed., 1993).
13. According to one source, more than 900 private banks existed before 1949. Id. at
187.
14. Id. ("The People's Bank of China was established in 1948, was designated the cen-
tral bank soon after the revolution.").
15. JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, CHINA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM: MODERNIZATION AND TRA.
DrION 175 (1993) ("It was further announced that anyone indulging in currency specula-
tion would be punished. Several well publicized executions convinced doubters .... ").
16. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT ON EXCHANGE ARRANGE-
MENTs AND EXCHANGE RESmcnONS 107 (1981). Within 10 years of 1949, the renminbi
was the only remaining currency circulated in China. William Triplett, The Banking Indus-
try, in DOING BUSINESS wITH CHINA 190, 191-192 (William W. Whitsoa ed., 1974) ("Prior
to 1947, the Communists issued various currencies in the regions of tOeir authority ....
The last non-RMB [renminbi] notes were withdrawn from Tibet in 1959.") (footnotes
omitted).
17. Although the Chinese adopted the Soviet central planning model for their eco-
nomic policy, the actual level of planning was substantially less detailed than other cen-
trally planned economies. Donald C. Clarke, What's Law Got to Do With It?: Legal
Institutions and Economic Reform in China, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 1, 5 (1991). For a
concise introduction to Chinese economic reform, see Id. at 4-15.
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provisional measures.18 Two main foreign exchange policies were in
effect during this period, one forbidding circulation of foreign curren-
cies within China and the other providing for state supervision over all
inflows and outflows of foreign exchange.19 Thus, currency use within
the PRC was highly controlled.
2. Low Levels of Foreign Direct Investment
Direct investment by foreign firms was not encouraged during the
first three decades of the People's Republic of China,2 and thus
China had no impetus to develop accommodating exchange mecha-
nisms. After the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,21 (the "Cul-
tural Revolution") China began to seek more foreign cooperation and
technology, but still discouraged direct investment?3 As of 1978, the
inflow of direct investment by foreigners was less than $300 million a
year.23
18. CHENG YUAN, CHANGING PATrERNS IN CHINESE FOREIGN TRADE L'x, AND IN.
STnr-TrONs 45 (1991).
19. 1d. at 45-46.
20. See Cohen & Valentine, supra note 7, at 163 ("With a few exceptions of a rather
limited nature involving Soviet, East European or overseas Chinese capital, for the first
three decades of its existence the PRC remained hostile to foreign investment.") (footnote
omitted). See also Liu Hongru, Developments in the Reform of China's Banking and Fi-
nancial Systems, 2 J. Chinese L. 323, 338 (1988) ("Prior to 1978, China's economy was
closed to the outside world and financial contact with foreign countries was minimal.").
21. The Cultural Revolution was a complex social upheaval engineered by PRC
founder Chairman Mao Ze Dong which "wrought terror and disorder on China."
JONATHAN D. Sm.Ecn, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 439 (1990). Dates are generally
given for the movement as 1966-1976. Id. at 791. During the Cultural Revolution, banking
activities were dismissed as bourgeois and funds were distributed arbitrarily. Amy E.
Yates, Comment, The Role of the Black Market in China's International Financial System, 7
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 833, 835 (1986). For a comprehensive discussion of the history of
Modem China, see SPEN CE, supra.
22. Cohen & Valentine, supra note 7, at 164 ('[D]espite its interest in these other
forms of cooperation [contracts to import technology], for a generation China did not util-
ize FDI [Foreign Direct Investment] as an additional means of importing technology.").
23. Sino Xenophiia, Survey: When China Wakes, at 13, in EcoNO.IST, Nov. 28.1992.
1995]
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3. Inconvertibility of the Renminbi
Furthermore, inconvertibility,24 an aspect of the centrally-
planned economy,' was anathema to foreign investment. Therefore,
rather than convert renminbi into foreign exchange, the PRC relied on
barter (also known as countertrade) with Communist countries,26 or
24. Because of the plethora of controls placed on foreign exchange in the PRC, the
renminbi is generally referred to as "inconvertible." Currency convertibility is the ability
to exchange one currency for another without many governmental hindrances. See Rum
WEISWEILLER, How THE FOREIGN EXCHANOE MARKET WORKS 97-98 (1990). Certain
countries, like Switzerland, allow for full convertibility-letting any holder of domestic
currency demand and receive foreign currency at any time. ld. Other governments pro-
vide more limited forms of convertibility, with accompanying regulations. Id. at 98. The
United States, for example, has always granted U.S. citizens free convertibility of the dollar
(except for a period of limited restriction from 1968-1974). ld.
Similar to China, most former communist Eastern European countries are changing
their economies from the centrally planned model. These countries, lke China, are now
switching to market-oriented economies and are either seeking to make or have already
made their currencies convertible. For individual country studies and a full discussion of
the complex issues involved in attaining convertibility (especially with reference to Eastern
Europe), see CURRENCY CoNvERvrnIuxrY IN EASTERN EUROPE (John Williamson ed., In-
stitute for International Economics 1991).
While some commentators regard currency convertibility as the capability of con-
verting currency into real commodities, that is not the sense used in this Note. For a dis-
cussion of commodity-type convertibility, see PATRiCK COLLINS, CURRENCY
CoNvERTmrTY: THE RETURN TO SOUND MoNEY (1985).
25. One commentator offers the following well-balanced explanation of what defines a
centrally planned economy:
The sharp distinction sometimes drawn between "planned" economies and "mar-
ket" economies is, of course, false. Many of the so-called planned economies
have significant non-planned sectors, such as agriculture in Poland. In the United
States, on the other hand, agricultural markets are subject to significant govern-
ment intervention. Nevertheless, there is a difference between an economy
where a few state-owned institutions must do most of their buying and selling at
market prices and an economy where a few non-state actors must operate in a
world of fixed prices bearing little relation to supply and demand
Clarke, supra note 17, at 2 n.2.
26. In addition, the PRC is reported to have engaged in barter with several Third
World countries. Triplett, supra note 16, at 201. One source describes barter as follows:
Peking [Beijing] officials have indicated that this is their preferred form of settle-
ment as it facilitates planning and is, by definition in balance. The usual pattern is
the signing of a trade agreement by the People's Bank [of China] and the trading
partner's State Bank, covering settlement and the goods to be exchanged.... The
most important agreement with a non-communist country is the rubber-rice swap
with Sri-Lanka .... China agreed to export 200,000 tons of rice annually, and Sri
Lanka agreed to export 40,000-50,000 tons of rubber, depending on the world's
price of rubber.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Another source describes countertrade as follows:
When goods proposed for export to a NME [non-market, centrally-planned econ-
omy] are not of a sufficient priority according to state plan to merit government
approval of payment in hard currency, or when the exporter is convinced by the
[Vol. 18:359
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made settlements in the currency of the trading party with Third
World countries.2 7 In trade with other Western, capitalist countries
before 1968, the People's Bank of China made arrangements with in-
dividual banks, usually in pounds sterling.28
When a sharp devaluation of that currency by the British govern-
ment resulted in an immediate depreciation of all Chinese exports, the
PRC switched to renminbi for later trade? 9 Certain Western banks
were allowed to sell renminbi, provided the foreign trader had an un-
derlying contract with a state owned trading organization.30
In light of these tight controls, the People's Bank of China played
a passive role of servant to the central plan.31 Foreign exchange re-
ceipts were essentially viewed as another, albeit special, commodity
under the central plan.32 Barter33 and non-cash allocations34 reduced
the amount of cash and foreign exchange involved in trade.
B. Foreign Exchange Controls after the "Open Door" (1978-
1993)
The open door policy initiated under Chairman Deng Xiao Ping
in 1978 resulted in a new influx of trade and direct investment for
China.35 Unlike earlier agricultural reforms pioneered by Deng, these
NME that such is the case, the NME may allow payment for the foreign imported
goods only by the acceptance of local NME goods.
RALPH I"L FoLsos Er AL., INTERNATIONAL BusNEss TRANSACrTONS IN A NtrsHEuT 276
(1992). A list of the countries and their payment arrangements made with the PRC can be
found in INTERNATIONAL Mo NrARY FuND, supra note 16, at 108.
27. Triplett, supra note 16, at 201.
28. Id. See also Sander Tideman, Dealing with Nonconvertibility and Other Financial
Aspects of Doing Business in China, E. AsAiN E.xncuTrw REP., July 15,1993, at 16,17 ("It
could be said that until 1968, there was no foreign exchange problem in China: all interna-
tional trade was conducted in pounds sterling."), available in LEXIS, Asiapc library. Ea-
sian file.
29. Triplett, supra note 16, at 201; Tideman, supra note 28, at 17. After the devalua-
tion, "an attempt was made to use the Swiss franc, but it has not been universally ac-
cepted." Triplett, supra note 16, at 201. But cf. INmRNATioNAL MOimARY FuN , supra
note 16, at 108 (stating that the PRC used the Swiss franc to express trade transactions with
a list of communist countries).
30. Triplett, supra note 16, at 202 ("The foreign bank is forbidden to sell RMB
[renminbi] unless the merchant can show a signed contract with one of the PRC's state
trading companies.").
31. Hongru, supra note 20, at 339.
32. Id.
33. See supra note 26.
34. Allocation conditions bank disbursements on the availability of physical goods that
can be controlled in both production and price. Mfiplett, supra note 16, at 193.
35. The 'open door' economic policy of China was initiated in 1978, shortly after the
death of Chairman Mao, as part of the ambitious 'Four Modernization' plan of the new
1995]
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reforms were not unleashed on the whole of China, but only in certain
selected areas for fear of capitalist influence on too grand a scale.36
The influx of foreign direct investment was directed into Special Eco-
nomic Zones and Economic and Technological Development Zones.37
The investment created a need for new foreign exchange controls
which would address two principal problems: the use of dual curren-
cies and the difficulty of converting renminbi proceeds into foreign
exchange.
1. No Longer "The People's Money"-- Foreign Bxchange
Certificates
Starting in 1980, foreigners in the PRC were issued Foreign Ex-
change Certificates (FECs), a foreigners-only currency nominally
equivalent to the renminbi, for their foreign exchange, -8 Other than
this buffer currency, all foreign exchange was placed under tight re-
striction by the new State General Administration of Exchange Con-
trol (SGAEC), which was instructed to prohibit the circulation,
leadership. FOREIGN TRADE, supra note 8, at 1. See also Cohen & Valentine, supra note 7,
at 164 ("China's decision to accept FDI [foreign direct investment] was the result of a
fundamental shift in political leadership and economic policy that began after the Cultural
Revolution and that crystallized ... in December 1978."). The four areas to be modern-
ized were agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. Id.
One commentator described the level of foreign trade expansion its follows:
Since the adoption in late 1978 of an 'open-door policy' of welcoming foreign
investment in and trade with China, China's foreign trade has grown rapidly. To
date [1987], the People's republic of China has established trade relations with
over 176 countries and regions and has signed trade agreements or protocols with
some 94 countries. Moreover, in addition to become increasingly active in inter-
national trade matters under the auspices of various United Nations bodies,
China established relations with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATr) in 1980 ....
Horsley, The Regulation of China's Foreign Trade, in FOREIGN TRADE, supra note 8, at 7
(citations omitted). For more recent figures of China's trade see supra lext accompanying
note 4.
36. The South China Miracle, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 1991, at 19 ("Unlike the rural re-
forms, [the 'open door' policy] was applied selectively, so that China as a whole should not
risk veering on to the 'capitalist road."').
37. For a discussion of SEZs and ETDZs, see supra notes 9-10 and eccompanying text.
38. The FEC notes, somewhat smaller than the equivalent renminbi denominations
and inscribed in English, stated on their backs that the "yuan expressed in this certificate is
equivalent in value to the Renminbi yuan." See Dinah Lee, China Opens Door to a Black
Marke" Foreigners' Scrip Buys Luxury Goods, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1985, at A12 ("The
foreign scrip is issued in the same denominations as the regular Chine,.e currency, but in
different colors and slightly different sizes."). The circulation of FECs began on April 1,
1980. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FuND, supra note 16, at 111. It ended with the Foreign
Exchange Reforms discussed infra.
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pledging, or use of foreign currency in the PRC.3 9 The SGAEC was
also to prohibit unauthorized transactions and ensure that all foreign
exchange buying and selling was conducted by the People's Bank of
China.no
The government created this second currency to serve several
objectives: curbing foreign currency speculation; preventing foreign
merchandise from flooding the domestic market; and increasing the
PRC's foreign exchange reserves.41 The first objective was only
weakly served by the regulations, as the speculators and black market-
eers quickly embraced the FEC.42 Neither was the currency excep-
tionally successful in furthering the second objective: the limitation
prevented Chinese nationals from buying foreign merchandise only to
the extent that FEC-only stores selling the imported merchandise,
such as Friendship Stores, refused to accept the currency from them. 43
As for foreign exchange reserves, the creation of the FEC ensured
that nationals would not directly drain government foreign exchange
to finance imports outside of the state plan. It did not, however,
prevent nationals from indirectly depriving the government of foreign
exchange via black market transactions.
The foreign exchange certificate created a hinderance to foreign
direct investment mainly because the value of the two currencies dif-
fered. Although the Chinese government considered the FEC to be
39. The Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China Governing Foreign
Exchange Control [hereinafter Foreign Exchange Control] (promulgated December 18,
1980) established the SGAEC in Article 3 and the enumerated prohibitions in Article 4.
The English and Chinese texts of most of the regulations listed in this Note can be found in
COMMERCIAL, BusINss AND TRADE LAws: PEoPLEs REPuntuc OF CHINA (Owen D.
Nee, Jr. ed., 1991). Original texts and English translations of regulations mentioned in this
piece promulgated before 1988 are also available in CHINA'S FOREIGN ECoNoMIc LEGiS.
LAION, VOL. I (Foreign Languages Press 1982); CHINA'S FOREIGN EcoNoMlIC LEGiSLA.
TION, VOL II (Foreign Languages Press 1986); and CHINA'S FOREIGN ECONO. IC
LEGISLATION, VOL M (Foreign Languages Press 1937). Since the translations differ
slightly in these sources, it is best to check the date on which the law was promulgated.
40. Foreign Exchange Control, supra note 39, arts. 3, 4.
41. Yates, supra note 21, at 838. See also Foreign Exchange Control, supra note 39,
art. 1 (lists increasing foreign exchange reserves as a purpose of the regulations).
42. Yates, supra note 21, at 840 ("Apparently, in its meager attempt to control the
growing black market, the Chinese government may have fueled a bigger market."). 'e
black market is discussed infra Part II.C.3.
43. It (reporting that stores in Shanghai sold foreign goods to anyone presenting
FEC).
44. Id. at 845.
1995]
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"equivalent in value" to the renminbi,45 the currencies' purchasing
power in relation to imported goods resulted in a higher value for the
FEC.4 6 Because foreign funded enterprises and their expatriate em-
ployees had to pay for some domestic goods and most services47 with
the FEC, a de facto two-tier price system existed whenever the same
price was offered to domestic enterprises that paid in renminbi.48 In
short, the creation of the FEC was a hidden form of discrimination
against foreigners and foreign direct investment.49
2. Foreign Direct Investment Proceeds Non-Convertible
Another damper to foreign direct investment is the difficulty of
converting renminbi into foreign currency for repatriation of profits50
or for operational expenses 1 Strict guardian of its foreign exchange
reserves, the PRC has always encouraged all enterprises, including
45. As stated on the back of an FEC certificate. See Lee, supia note 38, at A12
("These certificates were introduced in the spring of 1980 as a special ,crip for foreigners,
and are officially valued at 1 to 1 for the regular Chinese currency.").
46. China's Currency; Dead Certs, ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 1986, at 80 ("Although the
renminbi and FEC have the same face value, the extra purchasing powcr of the certificates
commanded a fat premium on the black markets."). Recognizing this absurdity, many for-
eigners have referred to the FEC as "funny money." End of 'Funny Money', J. COM., Dec.
30, 1993, EP Sec. at 6A.
47. See Yates, supra note 21, at 838 ("FECs are required for the payment of all govern-
ment services.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
48. For example, if the black market offers 1.5 renminbi yuan for one FEC (as it did
when the author visited the PRC in 1993), a cola costs 50 percent more in a friendship store
than it would at a street market, where renminbi is commonly accepted.
The two-tiered rate system referred to in this Note is not to be confused with the two-
tiered system established by the PRC's use of a lower exchange rate for certain "internal"
transactions which ended in 1985. One commentator describes that system as follows:
Between 1980 and 1984, China operated a dual exchange rate system, designed to
discourage imports, encourage exports and maximize tourist revenues. The gov-
ernment fixed the exchange rate at Rmb2.8:US$1 for all domestic importing and
exporting organizations. The Rmb rate applying to all foreign entities' transac-
tions through the Bank of China, however, was set at a lower rate of
Rmbl.5:US$1. Thanks to overseas pressure following allegations of protection-
ism, the two rates were unified in 1985 to a single rate of Rmb2.8:US$1.
Money and Banking-11.1: Currency: Renminbi, CHINA HAND, Oct. 1, 1993, at 5, available
in LEXIS, Asiape Library, China File [hereinafter CHINA HAND]. See also Lee, supra note
38, at A12.
49. Further forms of discrimination against foreign direct investment by the PRC are
explored infra Part IV.A.
50. Cohen & Valentine, supra note 7, at 188-89; Hard Currency Problem, supra note 3,
at 519-21.
51. Hard Currency Problem, supra note 3, at 519-20 (listing "the servicing of hard
currency loans, import of equipment, parts or raw materials, and payment of expatriates'
salaries and technology licensing fees" as operational expenses).
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foreign funded enterprises, to concentrate on exports to earn needed
foreign exchange (also known as "balancing" foreign exchange),5z
However, as the discussion below will show, the current view has
shifted somewhat from the former Chinese position which considered
balancing foreign exchange the sole responsibility of the enterprises.5 3
3. Alternative Means of Obtaining Foreign Exchange
Under the strict enforcement of PRC law, generating foreign ex-
change soon became a major problem for managers of foreign funded
enterprises, especially in the production sector. 4 In certain cases, the
foreign exchange problem became acute. The American Motors Cor-
poration joint-venture in Beijing is one well-known example.5  Be-
cause of a shortage of foreign exchange to pay for parts, production of
the "Beijing Jeep" was completely halted in early 1986.56 This and
other experiences forced the PRC to reconsider the goals of the "open
door" policy, which at the time were the generation of foreign ex-
change for backing domestic reforms, 7 and begin to welcome invest-
52. Cohen & Valentine, supra note 7, at 188-89; Hard Currency Problem, supra note 3,
at 520-21.
53. Cohen & Valentine, supra note 7, at 189 ("In principle, each venture is thus sup-
posed to balance its own foreign exchange account.").
54. Hard Currency Problem, supra note 3, at 521 ("According to Chinese government
statistics, only one-third of the 4,000 foreign investment enterprises operating in China by
the end of 1987 were able to balance their foreign exchange accounts.") (footnote omit-
ted). See Mary Lee, Foreign Investment: New Rules Help but it's a Struggle For Some, FAR
E. ECON. REv., Mar. 20, 1986, at 87-88 ("Mofert's [a central PRC trade body] deputy
director of foreign investment... maintains that approximately half the joint ventures in
the production sector ... have foreign exchange 'difficulties'.") (emphasis added).
It must be emphasized that not all ventures had difficulty generating foreign exchange.
Cohen & Valentine, supra note 7, at 188 ("Those ventures established with FDI that are
export-oriented or provide services to foreign tourists are able directly to earn foreign
exchange and have been the most successful in avoiding serious foreign exchange deft-
cits."). However, production-oriented joint ventures not only provide an influx of Western
capital and utilize Chinese labor, but they also infuse Chinese factories with important new
technology.
55. Doron P. Levin, AMC, China Agree on 2-Month Halt of Jeep Production, WALL
ST. J., May 23, 1986, at 25. For examples of other joint ventures with foreign exchange
problems, see Julia Leung, Westerners' Joint Ventures in China Encounter Bureaucratic De-
lays, Foreign-Exchange Blocks, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1985, at 38.
56. Levin, supra note 55, at 25. Production resumed several months later, after China
relaxed its currency controls in return for promises from AMC to scale down production
on Jeeps made from imported parts. China Notes: Jeep Production is Resumed in Peking,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1986, at 18.
For a more detailed account of the early history of the AMC-Beijing Jeep joint ven-
ture see Jim MANN, BEIJNG JEEP How WESTERN BusiNEss SrALLED IN CENA (1989).
57. Sino Xenophilia, supra note 23, at 14. TWo other commentators also noted that for
many years the PRC remained satisfied with the special interest of investors generally
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ment that brought in other kinds of benefits, like the transfer of new
and more efficient technology.58 To codify China's new view, regula-
tions were promulgated in 1986 and 1987 to provide several methods,
other than export, of obtaining foreign exchange.59
outside the industrial sector. Cohen & Valentine, supra note 7, at 194. They have classified
these investors into three types, noting how they account for a prodigious share of the
foreign direct investment in China:
Hong Kong investors, who, as we have seen, accounted for most major FD1 [For-
eign Direct Investment] from 1979 to 1985 .... are well situated to .ake advantage
of small "windows of advantage," especially in the adjacent Shenzlen SEZ and in
Guangdong Province generally. For example, they can utilize PRC quotas for
textile exports to the United States or provide services to foreign taurists or busi-
ness people. Familial ties or concern for the implications of Hong Kong's reunion
with the PRC in 1997 have also provided strong incentives for some wealthy com-
patriots to demonstrate their loyalties by investing in China.
Oil companies have also been largely motivated by factors that minimize the
effect of high costs. As we have seen,.., as of 1985, over 60% of the total FI
pledged by American, Western European and Japanese companies had been for
offshore oil developmenL These companies came to the PRC for essentially stra-
tegic reasons-the effects of the so-called "oil shocks" of the 1979's had vividly
demonstrated the need to diversify sources of oil-and the PRC represented one
of the last untapped frontiers.
The story is similar with respect to a third type of investor, one committed to
development of China's tourist facilities. We have seen that until 1986, the major-
ity of FDI was pledged to non-productive enterprises including hotes, other tourist
projects, taxi companies and other service industries ....
Id at 194 n.120 (emphasis added) (internal cross-references omitted).
58. As in the Beijing Jeep case noted above. See Leung, supra note 55, at 38 (Shang-
hai official finds the number of industrial projects unsatisfactory as over 60% of investment
pledged for Shanghai was either for hotel or office construction).
59. There are six regulations which relate to the establishment of alternatives for ven-
tures not concentrating on exports: (1) Regulations of the State Council Concerning the
Issue of Balancing Foreign Exchange Receipts and Disbursements by Joint Ventures Using
Chinese and Foreign Investment (promulgated Jan. 16, 1986) [hereinafter Joint Venture
Balancing Provisions]; (2) Provisions of the State Council Regulations Concerning Encour-
agement of Foreign Investment (promulgated October 11, 1986) [hereinafter 22 Articles];
(3) Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade for Enterprises
with Foreign Investment to Solve the Balance of Foreign Exchange Receipts and Expendi-
tures by Purchasing Domestic Products for Export (promulgated Jan. 20, 1987, regulation
expanded the benefits of the Joint Venture Balancing Provisions and added wholly foreign-
owned enterprises) [hereinafter Measures for the Purchase and Export of Domestic Prod-
ucts]; (4) Trial Procedures Concerning the Use of Products for Iraport Substitution
(promulgated by the Guangdong Provincial People's Government, Dec. 8, 1986); (5) Meas-
ures Concerning Import Substitution for the Products of Chinese-Foreign Equity and Co-
operative Joint Ventures (issued Oct. 19, 1987); (6) Measures for the Administration of
Import Substitution for the Mechanical and Electrical Products of Chinese-Foreign Equity
and Cooperative Joint Ventures (issued in Oct. 1987), available in COMME-RCIAL, BUSINESS
AND TRADE LAws, supra note 39.
The list of methods which follows is by no means authoritative and is presented for the
purpose of providing an overview. For a more complete discussion of both national and
regional options for investors with foreign exchange difficulties, see Hard Currency Prob-
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a. Swap Markets
Probably the most successful of the PRC's efforts,60 the swap
markets allow firms to balance their foreign exchange by trading
renminbi for foreign exchange with other firms that have a surplus.
The swap markets arose from the system of hard currency retention
established under early 'open door' reforms.61 The retention quotas,
given in the form of certificates to domestic enterprises that generated
a foreign exchange surplus, allowed for a later purchase of foreign
exchange.62 A small market soon developed for unused retention
quotas among domestic firms who bought them with renminbi.63
Eventually, this practice was extended to foreign funded firms to al-
low for "adjustment" of foreign exchange imbalances in joint ventures
owned by the same foreign investor64 (e.g. a foreign exchange-rich ho-
tel and a Jeep factory serving the Chinese market).6s Later, all foreign
lem, supra note 3. For a recent discussion of how foreign funded enterprises are dealing
with the foreign exchange problem, see John Frisbie & Richard Brecher, A Tough Balanc-
ing Act, CHINA Bus. Rlv., NovJDec. 1993, at 9-13.
60. A survey published in 1993 indicates that the swap markets are the leading method
for obtaining foreign exchange. Frisbie & Brecher, supra note 59, at 11-12 (close to three-
quarters of foreign invested enterprises reported using the swap markets which provided
55% of their foreign exchange needs, 14 firms reporting 70%).
61. Tideman, supra note 28, at 17. One commentator offers the following explanation
of retention quotas:
Countries with a foreign-currency surrender requirement sometimes also estab-
lish "retention quotas." That is, exporters from the state are allowed to keep and
not surrender a portion of certain foreign currencies received. In some cases, this
may simply avoid the administrative costs associated with collecting exchange and
then providing it back to the firm for approved expenditures .... The firm may
find it difficult to otherwise obtain that foreign currency for use in paying for
imports that may not have a high governmental priority.
RIcHARD W. EDwARDs, ITrERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 386 (1985).
62. Tideman, supra note 28, at 17.
63. Id.
64. Joint Venture Balancing Provisions, supra note 59; Hard Currency Problem, supra
note 3, at 522.
65. Although they were not owned by the same investor, T-ow'ned Great Wall Sher-
aton Hotel in Beijing provided AMC's Beijing Jeep Corporation with over $2.5 million in
one of the earliest publicized foreign firm swaps. James R. Schiffman, Chinese Regulations
Seek to Mollify Investors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1986, sec. 2, at 12 (referring to swapping as
an "informal practice").
The Proctor & Gamble joint venture offers a more accurate example:
[Proctor & Gamble] operates a shampoo joint venture in Guangzhou that ex-
ports roughly 30% of its products. Hard currency earned from those exports isn't
enough to satisfy the venture's requirements. The shortfall is made up by export
sales of chemicals and towels from China by Hutchison Whampoa Ltd., a Hong
Kong company that has a stake in [Proctor & Gamble's] shampoo factory.
Julia Leung, Change for a Dollar, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1993, at RS.
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invested enterprises were granted entry into the former retention
quota market,66 which became known as the swap markets.
The swap market is governed by the State Gene:ral Administra-
tion of Exchange Control (SGAEC)67 and its various sub-bureaus,
and transactions take place in Foreign Exchange Transaction Centers
(FETCs, also referred to as "swap markets"). FETC; are located in
major cities and accommodate the multitude of enterprises with for-
eign exchange needs.' In 1992, a national swap market was estab-
lished in Beijing to better unify prices at swap centers across the
country.69 However, regional protectionist policies prevented cross-
border swapping70 and thus kept exchange rates higher in certain out-
lying exchange centers away from China's economic zones when de-
mand has outpaced supply.71
In practice, the bids between FETC brokers (which included cer-
tain foreign banks in China) and principals (including joint ventures)
must be submitted to government clerks who match them and deter-
mine their legality.72 Generally, most of the matching actually goes on
outside the market as sellers (or their brokers) find buyers and then
test rates with SGAEC officials.73 Buyers and sellers exchange checks
or use remittances (not cash) and the SGAEC receives a commission
on the completed transaction.74 FETC trading volumes increased to
over $25 billion in 1992,75 with the Shanghai center reporting a daily
turnaround of nearly $30 million in 1993.76 Foreign invested enter-
66. 22 Articles, supra note 59; Hard Currency Problem, supra note 3, at 522.
67. Also discussed supra note 39.
68. Hard Currency Problem, supra note 3, at 523.
69. China's Currency Swap Market, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1992.
70. Virginia Davis & Carlos Yi, Balancing Foreign Exchange, CHINA Bus. REv., Mar./
Apr. 1992, at 14, 18 (explaining that while one swap center can legally apply to another
city's swap center to swap currency, "approval of individual applicaiions is up to local
authorities"). See also Frisbie & Brecher, supra note 59, at 11.
71. Id. at 12 ("the swap rates themselves often move according to currency supply and
demand in the individual swap centers.").
72. Peter Hannemann, China; Big Spread in the Currency Exchange Rates, AusrL.
FIN. REv., June 23, 1993, at 33, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
73. Although some of the local branches of the SGAEC have officially disallowed this
practice in certain regions, it seems to be prevalent all over China. See Davis & Yi, supra
note 70, at 18 (stating Guangzhou allows prearranged exchanges but Shanghai and
Shenzhen require brokers). See also Julia Leung, Beijing Hopes its Currency Experiment
Will Help it Escape Monetary Dilemma, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 1988, at 6 (noting a phone
call to the SGAEC made as part of a swap market transaction by a Shanghai Hilton Hotel
accountant to test the rates).
74. Davis & Yi, supra note 70, at 18 (noting an average commission of .15%).
75. Tideman, supra note 28, at 117.
76. Hannemann, supra note 72, at 32.
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prise trading volume in the swap market has also increased
dramatically.'
b. Import Substitution
Although the idea of localizing production to avoid dependence
on foreign sources existed since the founding of the PRC,7 8 the legal
basis for selling domestic products in China for foreign exchange actu-
ally originated in 1983,79 and was further explained by legislation from
1986 onward.80 Import substitution applies only to products manufac-
tured by foreign invested enterprises that China needs to import.,,
These products can be sold to domestic firms for foreign exchange
with the approval of the Chinese foreign trade agency with appropri-
ate jurisdiction.' Although import substitution has attracted foreign
direct investment in certain areas because it presents a means of ac-
cess to the China's domestic markets s the reported success in utiliz-
ing import substitution to solve foreign exchange problems has been
minimal.s4 Furthermore, the Chinese government has since promised
77. Davis & Yi, supra note 70, at 16 (includes graph).
78. Hard Currency Problem, supra note 3, at 521 n.7.
79. Rules for the Implementation of Exchange Controls Relating to Overseas Chinese
Enterprises, Foreign Enterprise and Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated
Aug. 1, 1983), available in CONMSRcAI., BusiNEss AND TRADE LA'ws, supra note 39.
80. See laws cited supra note 59 (Joint Venture Balancing Provisions; Trial Procedures
Concerning the Use of Products for Import Substitution; Measures Concerning Import
Substitution for the Products of Chinese-Foreign Equity and Cooperative Joint Ventures;
Measures for the Administration of Import Substitution for the Mechanical and Electrical
Products of Chinese-Foreign Equity and Cooperative Joint Ventures). For a more detailed
discussion of import substitution, see Hard Currency Problem, supra note 3, at 531-42.
81. Rules for the Implementation of Exchange Controls Relating to Overseas Chinese
Enterprises, Foreign Enterprise and Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, supra note 79,
art. 12.
82. Hard Currency Problem, supra note 3, at 533.
83. Joseph Battat, Foreign Investments in China In The 90s: Developing Trends, E.
AsJAIN ExEctwrvE REP., Aug. 15,1991, at 11,14 ("Import substitution has become another
major reason for FDI in a variety of sectors, including electronics, computers, machinery,
beverages, packaging and chemicals. These projects have been lured by the size of the
highly protected domestic market.').
84. Frisbie & Brecher, supra note 59, at 11 (authors of survey on foreign funded enter-
prises in China report that import substitution "should not be viewed as a viable method of
balancing foreign exchange. In the survey only a single company indicated it is able to get
a government department or other Chinese entity to convert RMB earned through domes-
tic sales into foreign exchange, and these transactions meet only 10 percent of the venture's
total foreign exchange needs.").
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to eliminate import substitution policies in a market access memoran-
dum of understanding with the United States.8 5
c. Flexible Pricing
Certain regions have allowed foreign funded firms to balance
their foreign exchange through domestic sales of foreign exchange (or
of a mix of foreign exchange and renminbi) in a process known as
"flexible pricing." 86 Flexible pricing is separate from the national
laws promulgated in 1986-87 and exists on an ad hoc basis but is worth
mention because of its usefulness in balancing foreign exchange.87
Flexible pricing worked because prior to the Foreign Exchange Re-
forms many Chinese state-owned enterprises were allowed to keep a
portion of their foreign exchange income, 8 giving them enough lar-
gesse to make these purchases with some of this hard currency. Pay-
ing with foreign exchange often allowed them to purchase products
they might have had to pay for exclusively in foreign exchange as im-
ports, or obtain priority with suppliers.8 9 Many foreign funded firms
reported success with flexible pricing.90
d. Export of Domestically Purchased Products
Established with the Joint Venture Balancing Provisions and the
Measures for Purchase and Export of Domestic Products,91 this
method allows foreign funded firms with foreign exchange difficulties
85. Henrik Hansen, China Agrees to Increase Market Access for U.S. Exports, E.
ASIAN ExEcurivE REP., Oct. 15, 1992, at 16. But see Investment-Related Restrictions
Based on Industrial Policy Draw Criticism from the U.S., E. ASIAN ExEctnvE REP., May
15, 1994, at 12 ("While import substitution lists may no longer be circulated, the report
[from U.S officials in Beijing] states that both the capital budgeting prozess and the foreign
exchange system are biased in favor of local products in that they tend to make buyers
exhaust all local procurement possibilities before imports are approved.").
86. Hard Currency Problem, supra note 3, at 530.
87. l
88. Davis & Yi, supra note 70, at 16 ("Retention rates were last modified in January
1991, leaving anywhere from 40 to 70 percent of foreign exchange earned from exports at
the local level."). For a discussion of the retention system, see supra note 61 and accompa-
nying text.
89. Hard Currency Problem, supra note 3, at 530.
90. Frisbie & Brecher, supra note 59, at 11:
In our sample, domestic sales for hard currency are relatively common (34 per-
cent), and for firms that use it, this balancing method accounts for a substantial
share of their foreign exchange needs (average of 42 percent). Fifteen percent of
the sample derive at least half of the foreign exchange they require via this
method.
But cf. Interview, infra note 167 (describing the practice as not widespread).
91. Supra note 59.
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to purchase and export Chinese products for foreign exchange.92
While the procedure is subject to many bureaucratic and practical lim-
itations,93 some investors have used it successfully.94
e. Reinvestment of Renminbi Profits in a Another Enterprise
The Joint Venture Balancing Provisions9s also allowed foreign
joint ventures to invest renminbi profits in domestic Chinese firms and
cull the resulting foreign exchange earnings.96 Of the methods for ob-
taining foreign exchange presented herein, this method seems the
most doubtful.97
4. Some Preliminary Conclusions
Despite the implementation of the above methods, obtaining for-
eign exchange still remains a major problem for non-export oriented
foreign funded enterprises.98 Of the solutions, the swap markets
(which have recently been reported to be relatively permissive in al-
lowing access to foreign exchange) 99 and the export of domestically
92. For a more detailed discussion of this procedure, see Hard Currency Problem,
supra note 3, at 524-26.
93. Such as finding a domestic firm willing to sacrifice sales that would otherwise net
precious foreign exchange; getting official approval on an annual basis; getting provincial
approval when the product sought to be sourced under the wings of another province's
trade body, etc. Id. at 525-26.
94. Id. at 525.
95. Supra note 59.
96. For a more detailed discussion of this procedure, see Hard Currency Problem,
supra note 3, at 526-27.
97. Two commentators write:
[T]his method is not very attractive to foreign investors, who may, understanda-
bly, be quite reluctant to commit further investment funds in China when they are
still unable to realize a return in foreign exchange on funds already invested. Nor
is the method attractive to Chinese enterprises, because they vill have to pay out
foreign exchange to the foreign investor in return for a renminbi investment. Un-
less foreign investors are prepared to make such reinvestment arrangements more
attractive to a Chinese enterprise-for example, by also investing foreign ex-
change in it, by providing it with advanced technology, or by offering the Chinese
enterprise a new export channel-they are unlikely to arouse interest.
Id. at 527.
98. In a 1989 survey, 54 percent of Sino-American joint venture owners responding
reported foreign exchange shortages. Cecilia L. Wagner, A Survey Of Sino-American Joint
Ventures: Problems And Outlook For Solutions, E. AsiAN ExECUTIVE REP., Mar. 15, 1990,
at 9. The problem ranked third in severity amongst the problems in the survey. Id. at 9-10.
99. Joseph Kahn, China's New Currency Exchange Center May Create Havoc for For-
eign Concerns, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1994, at A12 ("But many companies have found the
existing swap market system relatively flexible in practice, allowing them to trade Chinese
currency for foreign exchange well before they meet targets for earning hard currency
through exports.").
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purchased products seem to have been most successful.10" Conclu-
sions on the expected impact of the current reforms on this issue are
presented below.101
C. The Confusion Before Reform: Three Exchange Rates
In addition to non-convertibility and the exchange constrictions
of the FEC discussed above, multiple exchange rates, with a total of
three foreign exchange rates and accompanying ma-rkets,10 2 caused
further difficulties. Puzzled investors had to choose either the official
rate, the swap rate, or the black market rate. 0 3
1. The Official Rate
The official value of the renminbi (and FEC)' ° was determined
by the government under a system mixing market guidance and gov-
ernment intervention (a so called "managed float"), with the SGAEC
setting rates daily.' 05 One way market forces entered the calculation
was through a weighted combination of currencies, which have re-
mained unspecified, but probably included the United States and
Hong Kong dollars and the Japanese yen.106 The official exchange
rate rose from a symbolic one to one par with the U.S. dollar at the
founding of the PRC, to a low of roughly 5.7 shortly before the cur-
rent reform, largely as a result of official devaluations. 10 7
This rate was used exclusively by the Bank of China and its sub-
sidiaries until 1993, when a rate slightly below the swap rate began to
be offered to Chinese nationals and their businesses with proper docu-
mentation at some of these banks.'08 Foreign direct investments (con-
tributions of capital, equipment, and technology), however, were
100. Wagner, supra note 98, at 9. Frisbie & Brecher, supra note 59, at 11.
101. See infra part IV.
102. Sender, supra note 11, at 64-65; Leung, supra note 65, at R8.
103. Sender, supra note 11, at 64-65; Leung, supra note 65, at R8.
104. Which was considered by the Chinese government to be equal to the renminbi,
despite the former's higher purchasing power. See supra part II.B.1.
105. CHINA HAND, supra note 48, at 4.
106. Id. at 4-5 (although the currencies are unspecified, "these three represent the cur-
rencies of China's three largest trading partners."). Cf. INTERNAtiONAL MONETARY
FunD, supra note 16, at 107 (official rate calculation based on a "basket of internationally
traded currencies, weighted with reference to their importance in China's external transac-
tions and trends in their relative values").
107. Tideman, supra note 28, at 17.
108. CHINA HAND, supra note 48, at 3. Foreigners still obtained FIEC when converting
foreign exchange at the official rate.
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always registered at the official rate.109 Even with swap markets, cer-
tain trade transactions under state plan also used this rate.11 This
practice granted certain state owned firms an edge (compared to pri-
vate firms and foreign funded enterprises forced to use the swap mar-
ket) because they could obtain necessary raw materials and imports at
a lower cost."'
2. The Swap Rate
Because, as illustrated in the discussion above, the swap markets
are sanctioned by the PRC, one may consider the swap rate another
"official" rate. But unlike the stable official rate, swap rates vary as
swap markets in different geographical areas operate under varying
local rules and market conditions (supply and demand).112 As men-
tioned earlier,113 China established a national center to help unify
these rates. The swap rates remained higher than the official rate by a
narrow margin for several years, 4 until the hard currency crisis dis-
cussed in Part II dramatically widened the gap.
3. The Black Market Rate
Until recently, black market currency exchanges remained small
in nature, relegated to curbside transactions with foreign nationals
109. Sender, supra note 11, at 65 (also noting that foreign firms can compensate for the
overvalued renminbi when calculating the value of equipment and technology, negotiations
over exchange rates can be "deal-breakers"). See also Lincoln Kaye, Discipline Restored,
FAR E. ECON. lrv., Sept. 9, 1993, at 58 (explaining an equity evaluation process %here
Chinese and foreign contributions are given U.S. dollar equivalents and then under and
over estimated respectively to reflect U.S. dollar terms).
110. Kate Yu Juan, China's Currency Reform Vital but Some Tough Problems Remain,
STRArrs TiMEs, Jan. 6, 1994, Comment and Analysis, at 26, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Strait File.
111. 1I ("The old system was also a form of subsidy for state-owned companies, which
were allowed to buy hard currencies at the official rate and then to rely on the unrealistic
rate to buy raw materials at cheap prices."). For further discussion of this issue, in light of
the new reforms, see infra part m.B.2.b.
112. Economist Intelligence Unit, Money And Banking: 11.2 China's Foreign Exchange
Adjustment Centres, CHINA HAND, Oct. 1, 1993, at 8-10, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Li.
brary, China File.
113. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
114. Cohen & Valentine, supra note 7, at 191 (reporting a one yuan margin in 1985).
The gulf widened before the Tiananmen crisis in 1989 with increasing demand for con-
sumer durables, but quickly narrowed with the following austerity program and two official
rate devaluations. Davis & Yi, supra note 70, at 16 (graph); see also id. at 18 (noting that
swapping became easier because the swap rates were so close to the official rate). The rift,
however, has again widened since 1992. Sender, supra note 11, at 65 (includes graph show-
ing the "widening gulf").
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working or traveling in China. 115 Similar to the swap market, the rates
in these transactions were set by supply and demand, on a more local-
ized scale.116 However, increases in foreign exchange demand led to
an increase in the size of black market trades, as some firms began
bypassing the swap markets altogether. 1 7 The black market devel-
oped its own "market makers.""18
IM. Crisis and Change
Understanding the effects of the Foreign Exchange Reforms on
foreign direct investment necessitates an understanding of the role of
the reforms in regaining control over China's economy. As the discus-
sion below will illustrate, the reform of the foreign exchange system is
an effort to regain central government control over the spending of
state enterprises and provincial governments as well as stem capital
flight.
A. The Crisis
1. Foreign Exchange Outflows and Capital Flight
Despite the PRC's need for capital for production-intensive ven-
tures and investment in infrastructure, large amounts of foreign ex-
change have flowed out of the country both legally and illegally. In
addition, the value of the .PRC's currency has been endangered be-
cause of a lack of control over the financial system.
a. Legal Capital Ouiflows
As for China's legal overseas investment, levels have soared in
recent years. 1 9 Large PRC transnational corporations invest in legiti-
115. Yates, supra note 21, at 843 ("[A]mong foreigners young tourists are the main
contributors of foreign exchange and FECs.").
116. Id. (noting higher rates when tourism is down).
117. Elizabeth Cheng, Arbitrage in China, FAR E. ECON. REv., May 21, 1992, at 44
(describing how currency couriers travel to a foreign exchange rich Special Economic Zone
from "currency hungry" areas of China carrying average amounts equivalent to US
$183,500 for trade on the black market).
118. Kaye, supra note 109, at 58 (defining market makers as "wholesale traders who
specialize in matching large-scale buy-and-sell orders").
119. Friedrich Wu, Stepping Out the Door: Chinese Investments Abroad, CHINA Bus.
REv., Nov./Dec. 1993, at 14, 18. According to the International Monetary Fund, cumula-
tive Chinese investment abroad has risen from just under one billion ini 1985 to 5.5 billion
in 1991, based on statistics provided by the Bank of China, the supplier of foreign exchange
in the PRC. Id. See also E.S. Browning, High Rollers, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1994, at Al
("No one has complete figures, but U.S. Commerce Department data on large foreign
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mate ventures officially "aimed" at raising foreign exchange income,
bypassing host-country trade barriers, entering new markets, gaining
advanced technology and modem management skills, and obtaining
reliable supplies of important natural resources.120 However, a weak
track record for many projects invites the suspicion that the actual
motivation might be to move capital outside of China.' 1
b. Capital Might
Although levels of illegal investment and capital flight are diffi-
cult to detect and quantify because, by definition, they are concealed,
economists believe that billions of dollars are exiting the country ille-
gally.122 Many suspect that a good portion of these funds, once trans-
ferred offshore, come back into the PRC disguised as foreign direct
investment in order to enjoy the tax and other benefits accorded by
the Joint Venture Laws, Special Economic Zones, and Economic and
investments showed just $26 million in Chinese assets here in 1985; by 1991, the latest year
for which the department has figures, China's assets had nearly hit S1 billion.").
120. Wu, supra note 119, at 15. The goals listed above are the requirements established
by China's Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFERT) for approving Chinese funded non-trade
joint ventures abroad.
However legitimate the purposes, some of the investment moves by these firms have
resulted in huge losses. For example:
China International Trust & Investment Corp. (Citic), the government's premier
international investment arm, has lost millions of dollars on a decrepit Delaware
steel mill and a worthless Colorado gold mine.
One of the Foreign Trade Ministry's biggest business units, China National
Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corp. (known as Minmetals), has made prof-
its importing and exporting in the U.S. But it has wiped out that profit every year
since 1990 by speculating in U.S. real estate.
China's biggest construction group, China State Construction & Engineering
Co., has been losing money here since 19S6, investing in more than 20 projects
nationwide, including a string of Georgia retirement homes that U.S. advisers
urged it to avoid.
Browning, supra note 119, at Al.
121. See id. at A12 ("In some cases, Chinese company officials are so eager to get
money out of the country and into a safe place that profits are a secondary issue.").
122. China's Footloose Capital, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1994, at A16:
Economist Friedrich Wu has examined "errors and omissions" in China's balance
of payments, and finds evidence of SS billion disappearing in 1992. Frank Gunter
of Lehigh University has compared China's trade statistics with those of its major
trading partners. He suspects enough money leaks out through phony import and
export invoices to bring the total to roughly $20 billion a year.
See also Lincoln Kaye, This Money Has Wings, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 15, 1993, at 72
(details of Gunter study); Harry Sender, Follow the Money. China Faces Big Challenge in
Controlling Capital Flows, FAR E. ECON. R-v., Oct. 14, 1993, at 74 (Another commenta-
tor, also basing estimation on deficits in China's "errors and omissions category," reports
that capital flight "more than doubled between the first and second half of 1992 .. -).
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Technological Development Zones (discussed supra part I1).123 Ac-
cording to one commentator, many sham "foreign" joint ventures
were established to evade high tariffs on the import of foreign cars."2 4
Other outflows are suspected to float into personal bank accounts and
real estate abroad.'2s
c. Lack of Control over the Financial System
Exacerbating the problem is the PRC's lack of control over its
financial system. Although substantially restructured since the cen-
trally-planned model described above, 126 the banking system is prey to
pressures from both the central government bureaucracy above (to
lend to loss-making state owned enterprises) and China's regions be-
123. Brauchli, supra note 6, at A12. Cf Anthony H. Adams, Hong Kong's Charms,
CHINA Bus. REV., NovJDec. 1993, at 19 (reporting estimates that 80 percent of the "Hong
Kong" foreign investors in China are actually Hong Kong subsidiaries of mainland firms or
"fake foreign investments"). For a discussion of the foreign investment benefits offered in
SEZs and ETDZs see text accompanying and sources cited supra notes 9-10.
124. Brauchli, supra note 6, at A12:
Many companies were set up by Chinese investors through overseas subsidiaries
to take advantage of preferential tax treatment for foreigners or to exploit duty
exemptions for foreign ventures that import autos. Because China's auto import
duties can triple the price of a luxury car, many Chinese entrepreneurs establish
false foreign companies for the sole purpose of importing, for example, a Merce-
des-Benz or a Cadillac.
125. One reporter offers the following examples of questionable capital flows:
[M]any who do business with the Chinese have concluded that some investors are
primarily concerned with stashing cash abroad.
When China Travel Service, a government-linked travel agency, spent $100
million to build a theme park named Florida Splendid China, which opened in
Orlando in December, the local business community buzzed with talk that the
real goal might be to move money out of China....
Americans who monitor activities of the People's Liberation Army, which is
flush with dollars from gun exports to the U.S., say some Chinese military officials
are quietly buying U.S. companies and real estate....
Other Chinese investors "have siphoned money off from deal3 they did with
the Chinese government," charges Frederick Blumer, an Atlanta lawyer who has
helped Chinese businessmen obtain visas. "You see them driving around in big
Mercedes, wearing flashy clothes, going to the strip clubs."
Browning, supra note 119, at Al. See also Hornik, infra note 132, at 34 (noting how
"double invoicing" is rampant in the PRC: local authorities or firms buy equipment at one
price but are invoiced at a higher price, the difference is deposited in a foreign bank
account).
126. See Hongru, supra note 20, at 334-40. For an overview of the PRC's banking sys-
tem see Franklin D. Chu, Banking and Finance in the China Trade, in FOREIGN TRADE,
supra note 8, at 343-79.
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low (to lend to quick-buck ventures).12 7 Recent World Bank esti-
mates note that of all state bank loans, only thirty percent were based
on commercial standards, the remaining seventy percent were "policy
based" (i.e. loss-making).za Although the central bank sends notices
to branches that exceed their lending targets, they are repeatedly ig-
nored.'29 Furthermore, thirty percent of China's financial system is
estimated to be unofficial and unregulated as banks interlend and then
onlend to property development projects that promise quicker profits
than the loans to official state enterprises.130 As a result, China has
been forced to print new renminbi to cover the money lost to risky
ventures, increasing the money supply by alarming proportions.1 31
2. Regionalism
The decentralization of decision-making, initiated with Deng's
"open door" policy, gained full speed with Chairman Deng's 1992
blessings. Wealthy regions with hard currency from foreign invest-
ment ignored commands from Beijing. 32 Once given permission to
127. Harry Sender, Finance: Out of the Wilderness, FAR E. Eco. REv., Jan. 14, 1993,
at 40; see also James Walsh, China: Turning Down the Voltage, Ti~tE (Int'l ed.), Aug. 16,
1993, at 14.
128. Sender, supra note 127, at 41. Financial analysts note that many of the state run
enterprises borrow at attractive rates and then lend the money to private enterprises at "at
least twice" these rates in unregulated transactions. Carl Goldstein, Policies: Beijing Tries
Again to Cool China's Economy, FAR E. ECoN. R-v., Feb. 17, 1994, at 44.
129. Sender, supra note 127, at 43.
130. Id. at 38 (also noting that "[elach part of the state bank system has its underside
consisting of wholly owned non-bank financial institutions (NBFI) which account for much
of the runaway investment"-the lending supports "quick-buck projects such as nightclubs,
villas, racetracks and hotels" instead of basic infrastructure projects like roads).
131. Harry Sender, Cooling Down Growth, FARE. EcoN. REv., Sept. 2, 1994. at 36.37
(quoting World Bank estimates of a 31.3% increase in the money supply in 1992, and a
50% increase in the first quarter of 1993; World Bank graph illustrates a tripling of the
money supply since 1986).
132. Carl Goldstein, South China: Resisting the Centre, FAR E. ECON. Rnv., Sept. 2,
1993, at 42.
This central regional tension is nothing new to the PRC (although the economic gains
in the provinces in recent years have exacerbated the problem). One commentator argues
that decentralization and recentralization is a recurring motif in the Chinese economy:
The literature on Chinese political organization generally contains two con-
trasting images. One is that of the omnipotent center. The country is effectively
organized and led from the top, where leaders have the power to ensure compli-
ance from lower levels on most issues at any time. The second image is that of a
bickering, fragmented polity. Sub-central levels of the system have a great deal of
power in practice and are willing and able to thwart and subvert the demands of
the center ....
Even before the commencement of the reform program, the Chinese econ-
omy was in many ways highly decentralized. Several waves of decentralization
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attract foreign investment, many regions gained finacial indepen-
dence from the central government.133 When the center tried to
regain its control, the regions resisted, using foreign exchange for lev-
erage. For example, when the central government refused to provide
extra oil to Guangdong province, the most prosperous SEZ,
Guangdong bought its own oil on the international market. 134
Meanwhile, as certain (especially coastal) regions of China prof-
ited, others (generally in the interior) suffered. Regional protection
policies hampered the flow of goods and capital.135 Several regions
were reported to have established their own "de facto" currencies to
prevent the flow of goods.' 36 Peasants, frustrated with the prospect of
being paid in IOUs for their crops by cashless provincial govern-
ments,137 began to migrate to the industrial centers for real wages,
cluttering the train stations with their camps. 138
3. The Hard Currency Crisis
The impact of the above forces on China's foreign exchange sys-
tem was tremendous and unprecedented. The swap rate fell far below
had drastically reduced the power of central planners in favor of local govern-
ments and quasi-governmental management bodies. Each time, the failure to pay
attention to incentives facing local levels led to a lack of coordination and chaos,
resulting in a recentralization. This recentralization, however, was never com-
plete. Planning balances are extremely rough, leaving the working out of details
to sub-central bodies, and the central government has never regai'ied the finan-
cial control it lost during the Cultural Revolution.
Clarke, supra note 17, at 13-14. For a bearish overview of the current economic and polit-
ical climate of China, including many of the issues discussed in this section, see two essays
recently published under the overall title "China: The Muddle Kingdom." Richard
Hornik, Bursting China's Bubble, FOREIGN AiE., May/June 1994, at 28; Gerald Segal,
China's Changing Shape, FOREIGN Aim., May/June 1994, at 43.
133. Certain provinces now contribute a far larger proportion of taxes to the center
than centrally allocated receipts. Goldstein, supra note 132, at 42, 44 (Guangdong prov-
ince received 80 percent of its investment funds from Beijing in 1979, only two percent in
1992, and is now providing 27 percent of provincial revenues to the central government).
See also Clarke, supra note 17, at 15 ("The more funds local governments have under their
own control, the less they need to listen to Beijing."). The attitude of the provinces is
illustrated by the following: "Asked how much control Beijing had over Guangdong's eco-
nomic plans, the Chinese official [vice-governor of Guangdong] replied simply: 'None
whatsoever."' Goldstein, supra note 128, at 44.
134. Segal, supra note 132, at 46.
135. Id
136. Id
137. Walsh, supra note 127, at 17.
138. Hornik, supra note 132, at 37 ("The net result of the capital shortage is a shortage
of jobs and opportunities [in central provinces] .... By one government estimate, China's
'floating' population of migrant workers is well over 50 million.").
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the official rate as demand for foreign exchange escalated. 39 In mid-
1993, concerns over the swap rate's free fall inspired a government
cap on swap rates,14° which in turn spurred businesses into the black
market, with foreign invested firms sending out employees armed with
mobile phones to arrange currency exchanges with the "market mak-
ers" mentioned in the previous section. 41 Although some resulting
deals were crossed legally via the swap markets, illegal premiums were
paid under the table to make the deal go through. 42 The resulting
currency chaos prompted would-be arbitragers to invest in bogus cur-
rency futures agencies.'4 3
Bowing to the pressure, the SGAEC removed the cap and trading
again resumed at the fervent pace.14 The renminbi stabilized, but
only with considerable help from the central government selling off its
precious reserves of hard currency at a high thirty percent discount
from the official rate.'4
4. The Austerity Drive that Failed
Although discipline was restored to the swap market, internal
drives to cool down other economic unrest failed. The savior of the
swap markets, former "one-chop" mayor of Shanghai, 46 vice premier
Zhu Rongji was appointed governor of the Peoples Bank of China in
139. Sender, supra note 11, at 65 (graph indicates a less than one yuan gulf in January
1992 widening to a five yuan gulf in July, 1993).
140. Id. at 64-65.
141. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. Cf. Frisbie & Brecher, supra note 59.
at 12 ("In the first half of 1993.... 18 FIEs (44 percent of the survey sample) reported that
they had been approached to buy foreign exchange outside of the swap centers. Nine of
the 18 confirmed they completed off-market trades.").
142. Hanneman, supra note 72, at 33.
143. The PRC government recently recognized the existence of "illegal foreign ex-
change shops" which used high-tech equipment to defraud customers in so-called "futures"
transactions. Government Investigates Black Market Foreign Erchange Business in
Shenzhen, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 5,1994, Part 3 Asia-Pacific, available
in LEXIS, Asiape Library, Bbcswb File. The official Chinese English language newspaper
reported that residents of Guangzhou province have been cheated out of more than S1.3
million from these illegal shops. Li Wen, China: Guangdong Curtailing Illicit Trade in Cutr-
rency, CINA DAILY, in Bus. WK., Jan. 23, 1994, (China Daily Supp.) available in LEXIS,
News Library, Reuter File.
144. Id.
145. Kaye, supra note 109, at 58 (Hong Kong financier estimates the PRC spent over
US$300 million to support the renminbi in June of 1993 alone).
146. Zhu is renowned for his attempt to reduce the bureaucracy of the city which re-
quired many chops (the Chinese equivalent of a signature) for projects to go through.
Harry Sender, Paging "Action Man", FAR E. ECON. REv., July 15, 1993, at 72.
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an attempt to regain control of the economy. 47 Although Zhu vigor-
ously pushed a sixteen point program of reforms (with the help of
specially appointed central government teams) cracking down on cor-
rupt practices in lending and spending, the program was largely unsuc-
cessful in improving China's economic problems, including the
central-region conflicts.1'8 Because of well-placed guanxi ("connec-
tions") in regional governments, private enterprises evaded the credit
rationing, leaving the state run enterprises, China's equivalent of the
American welfare system, precariously in debt.' 49 For these and other
reasons, the austerity drive was abandoned. Zhu's previous success in
reigning in the swap markets could not be duplicated in governing the
People's Bank.
B. The Change: Foreign Exchange Reforms
Based on the successful rescue of the swap markets, and the fail-
ure of other measures, such as the austerity campaign, foreign ex-
change reform is a natural path for the central government to pursue.
By unifying the exchange rates and controlling domestic enterprise
access to foreign exchange, the PRC may be able to rein in capital
outflows and recentralize control over a greater portion of China's
economy.
1. The Unified Rate
On January 1, 1994, the PRC government effectively devalued the
official rate for the renminbi by thirty-three percent.150 In a tandem
move, the foreign exchange certificate (FEC) was eliminated from cir-
culation.151 The rate chosen was based on swap market prices prevail-
ing on the last business day before the reform-a realistic, market
driven approach to the renminbi's value.152 The Foreign Exchange
147. Id.
148. Walsh, supra note 127, at 14-18.
149. Carl Goldstein, Growth at Any Cost, FAR E. ECON. Rnv., Nov. 25, 1993, at 16.
150. Lincoln Kaye, Deafened by Decree, FAR E. ECON. REv., Jan. 13, 1994, at 80. But
cf. id. at 81 (stating that the term devaluation is incorrect because "most foreign exchange
dealings were already being conducted at the swap centres' quasi market rate").
151. Foreign Exchange Reforms, supra note 2, Part VII. For a discussion of the PRC's
handling of the changeover, see Kaye, supra note 150, at 80-81 (discussing the confusion
amongst FEC holders as the announcement of the demonetization of the FEC was not
accompanied by assurances that it would be accepted at the old rate until the FEC was
completely phased out; noting how they rushed to spend all their FEC before the an-
nouncement was finally made).
152. Id.
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Reforms dictated eliminating these "dual rates" (i.e. swap and official
rates) and adopting a "unified rate.' 53
a. New Interbank System
The unified rate is determined by a new, national inter-bank for-
eign exchange market comprised of banks authorized to deal in for-
eign exchange. 54 The promise of an inter-bank market 55 is a move
towards a monetary policy in line with other developed countries be-
cause it signals a lessening of intervention by the central government.
However, because the PRC is not ready to fully float 156 the renminbi
153. Foreign Exchange Reforms, supra note 2, Part III. For further reference, the Eng-
lish text of Part M is as follow:
After the introduction of the systems of selling and buying foreign exchange at
the banks, a national unified inter-bank foreign exchange market will be estab-
lished. The designated foreign exchange banks are main participants in the inter-
bank market, whose main functions are to facilitate the matching of long and
short foreign exchange positions of different designated banks, and to provide
clearing and settlement service for banks. This market is regulated and super-
vised by the People's Bank of China through the State Administration of Ex-
change Control.
The dual renminbi exchange rates are to be unified as of January 1. 1994.
The unified renminbi exchange rate will become a single, managed floating rate
based on market demand and supply of foreign exchange. The People's Bank of
China will publish daily the middle rate of renminbi against US dollar according
to the transaction price prevailing in the inter-bank foreign exchange market on
the previous day, and also, with reference to the changes of the international for-
eign exchange market, publish the renminbi rates against other major foreign cur-
rencies. Based on the foreign exchange rates published by the People's Bank, the
designated banks will then list their own exchange rates within the floating range
designated by the People's Bank, and purchase or sell foreign exchange to their
customers at the listed rates.
With the prerequisite of stabilizing the domestic currency, the listed ex-
change rates of different banks are to be maintained basically compatible and
relatively stable through inter-bank foreign exchange trading and the intervention
of the People's Bank through buying and selling foreign exchange in the foreign
exchange market.
154. Id.
155. It is labeled a "promise" because, as explained below, the inter-bank market cre-
ated by the PRC reforms differs from what other countries refer to as "inter-bank" trading
systems. China Abolishing the Swap Markets: April Fools?, Bus. CHwnA (Economist Intel-
ligence Unit, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 7,1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Buschin
File [hereinafter Abolishing Swaps].
156. Meaning a minimum of government intervention. See WESWETrLLEP, supra note
24, at 57:
If there are no parities fixed between the currencies of the world, then rates can
float freely, at no particular point is the central bank obliged to interfere. Few
people seriously advocate that central banks should not be allowed to intervene
in the foreign exchange markets ....
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as the United States has the dollar, it will maintain certain controls in
a "managed float based on market demand and supply."157
The main difference between the inter-bank system and the swap
market system is that only banks are allowed to trade ona the new mar-
ket, excluding all firms and trading entities, both domestic and foreign
funded.'5 8 The systems are linked electronically so that uniformity in
ask and bid (sell and buy) prices should be achieved.159 Firms that
want to purchase or sell foreign exchange will need to contact a desig-
nated bank for these transactions. 160
b. Fate of the Swap Market System
At the current stage of the implementation of the Foreign Ex-
change Reforms, foreign funded firms have been left to continue
utilizing the swap markets, though only through foreign and domestic
bank brokers. 16  This leaves only designated PRC banks in the inter-
bank market. 62 In practice, the separation of the two systems should
There are however, many who prefer the choice of these points to be taken on
adhoc basis by the government of the country and not fixed for years ahead.
157. See reprinted text of Foreign Exchange Reforms, Part III, supra note 153. The
level of management in the float became apparent when the People's Bank announced
caps on buying and selling rates just before implementation of the inter.bank market (dis-
cussed infra). See also Andrew Quinn, China Sets Tight Limits to New Forex Trade System,
Reuters World Service, Apr. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File ("The
official China Daily said.., the country's authorised foreign exchange banks could only
float their buying and selling rates within 2.5 per 1000 of the central bank benchmark 'to
avoid affecting the national economy too much."').
158. Abolishing Swaps, supra note 155.
159. 1l
160. Id.
161. When the inter-bank system opened in April, the initial news dispatch from the
Chinese government restricted foreign funded firms from the system without explanation.
Gordon Platt, Foreign Ventures to Be Denied Access to China's Interbanc; Enterprises May
Use Swap Centers, J. COM., Apr. 15, 1994, Trade sec., at 3A. Later, the government main-
tained that "[foreign invested enterprises] do not need the interbank forex market since
they do not have to sell their forex receipts to the PBOC and can still have access to the
existing swap markets." Sally Gelston, China: Foreign Exchange System Still in Flux, E.
AsIAN ExEcUTrIvE REP., Mar. 15, 1994, at 5.
Foreign banks were denied access to the inter-bank system and rem,-in only brokers in
the swap markets. Bill Savadove, New Rules Curb Foreign Bank Trading Of Yuan, J. CoM.,
Mar. 23, 1994, Front sec., at 2A (noting also that the PRC reneged on a promise to allow
them to quote their own currency prices). The scope of foreign bank activities in China is
still highly circumscribed, although recent decisions have created new opportunities and
opened up new geographic areas. For a concise discussion of the development of foreign
banking in the PRC, see Susan M. Cormac, Foreign Bank Branches on the Move, CHINA
Bus. RFv, May/June 1993, at 40-44.
162. However, some of the PRC's larger, multinational corporations have petitioned
for entry. Abolishing Swaps, supra note 155 ("[T]he Ministry of Foreign Trade and Eco-
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not result in different exchange rates because the PRC claims to apply
a "uniform exchange rate" to both, based on weighted average
prices.163 Since some former swap centers now house both systems,164
this type of price monitoring is highly feasible. No wide variation has
been reported between prices paid at swap markets and the inter-
bank rate. 65
2. New Controls for Domestic Entities
a. The Surrender System
Part I of the new foreign exchange rules requires all state enter-
prises, public institutions, government agencies, and social organiza-
tions in China to promptly surrender foreign exchange receipts to
designated Foreign Exchange Banks.1' This is a move of great im-
portance to the PRC's goal of centralizing control, because, if the sys-
tem is implemented properly by China's domestic banks, the result
nomic Cooperation (MOFIEC) is putting pressure on the PBOC to allow China's major
import-export companies to also have seats in the new foreign exchange markets. The
reason is that these huge corporations, with their heavy exchange needs, do not want to
work through banks-they want to be players in the market themselves.").
163. China Refutes US on Exchange System, XrNt-IA NEws A nEc NEws But.L, Aug.
11, 1994 (based on statement of People's Bank of China spokesperson), available in
LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
164. Tony Walker, Quiet Debut for New China Market, FIN. TiMEs, Apr. 5, 1994, at 4
(describing the new national center in Shanghai):
A foreign banker in Shanghai said that the new [Shanghai] interbank market was
effectively a "three-in-one" market. It would serve for the time being as a "swap
centre" for joint ventures, an interbank market for Chinese institutions and as a
market for foreign banks restricted to selling foreign currency on behalf of Chi-
nese customers. Joint venture customers are being confined to swap centre trad-
ing for the time being in an apparent attempt to lessen pressures on the market in
its early phase.
165. Reports have indicated the swap markets have been relatively stable. Anne Ste-
venson-Yang, Swap Centers Still Open for Business, CHINA Bus. Rlv., May/June 1994, at 4
("In April, reports from companies in Beijing suggested that the swap markets were func-
tioning as usual, with some companies denied access and others permitted to swap only
pre-determined amounts. No company, however, reported any significant change in the
available supply of foreign exchange."). However, should the rates tend to escalate again,
intervention by the government in stabilizing the swap rates is highly likely, with the gov-
ernment opening up its reserves as it did in the 1993 crisis. Kaye, supra note 109, at 5S
(cites unofficial estimate of US$300 million spent to prop up the swap markets).
166. Foreign Exchange Reforms, supra note 2 (Part I is entitled "To implement the
system of selling off foreign exchange receipts to the banks and abolish foreign exchange
retention system.").
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will be a framework where firms cannot as easily stockpile foreign
exchange proceeds for later speculative purposes or capital flight.167
What the banks are to do with the foreign exchange surrendered
depends upon how the receipts were generated, the receipts falling
into two general categories. The first category of foreign exchange
represents most of the large, market-oriented types of proceeds aris-
ing from trade, PRC service providers, and investment abroad. 168 The
central government intends to consolidate its control over this type of
foreign exchange by requiring it to be sold to officially sanctioned
banks for renminbi, based on the current rate of exchange listed by
the banks. 169 Thus, Chinese firms with substantial foreign exchange
proceeds will be prevented from spending them without first surren-
dering them for renminbi, and then using the renminbi to purchase
foreign exchange at the outstanding official exchange rate (possibly
reflecting depreciation). This procedure theoretically creates a paper
trail for the central government to track capital flows.
The other category of foreign exchange receipts consists of for-
eign exchange sources passive in nature or small in volume such as
investment, donations, and individual use.170 Foreign exchange within
167. 'This analysis assumes that China's central bank will ensure that the banks desig-
nated to handle foreign exchange will heed its commands. For a discussion of the issue of
China's control over its banking system, see sources cited supra note 126 and accompany-
ing text. One economist has told the author that the banks have been following the dic-
tates of the Foreign Exchange Reforms, although he noted that the exchange risk may lead
more Chinese firms to attempt to funnel foreign exchange offshore. Telephone Interview
with Guocang Huan, Senior Economist (Northeast Asia), J.P. Morgan (Hong Kong Office)
(Aug. 29, 1994).
168. The category consists of exchange receipts from:
(1) Foreign exchange earnings from exports, transit trade and other trading activi-
ties; (2) Foreign exchange earnings from services provided by communication and
transportation, post and telecommunications, tourism, insurance, and other ser-
vice industries, and from intergovernmental transfer; (3) Net fo;eign exchange
proceeds from foreign exchange operations of the banks, which are required to be
turned over to the State, and foreign exchange returns received from overseas
service contracts, and from investment abroad which are subject to repatriation;
and (4) Other foreign exchange receipts which are required to be sold off to
banks pursuant to the regulations of the exchange control administration.
Foreign Exchange Reforms, supra note 2, Part I. Note the catchall provision in the fourth
clause above, which provides for future latitude in this category.
169. Id.
170. The complete list consists of:
(1) Foreign exchange remittance to China for the purpose of inve3tment by non-
resident legal entities or natural persons; (2) Foreign exchange received from ex-
ternal borrowing, and debt or equity issuance; (3) Funds remitted back to China
by the service contracts companies within the contract period of their overseas
projects for current use of the project; (4) Receipts from foreign donations and
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these sub-categories is permitted to be held as such in accounts
opened with designated foreign exchange banks.17 1 To prevent abuse
of the benefits of this categorization, the Bank of China announced
intentions to set up special sections to examine the documents of
those claiming this category.172
In adopting a system of foreign exchange surrender, the PRC has
expressly and necessarily abolished previous foreign exchange reten-
tion procedures and official foreign exchange quotas for state run
firms. 173 Under the retention system (discussed above in connection
with the swap markets) state firms were allowed to open foreign ex-
change cash accounts depositing foreign exchange earnings and main-
taining the proprietary right to use the foreign exchange or exchange
it with other entities for renminbi.174 With the reforms, this procedure
ends and such firms no longer have the proprietary right to foreign
exchange earned from exporting activities or trading in the swap mar-
ket. Nor will enterprises be given foreign exchange quotas under the
state plan. Instead they will have to purchase it from the designated
banks based on the access controls described below.175
grants approved for specific purposes; (5) Foreign exchange receipts of diplomatic
missions, and residence offices of international organizations and other nonresi-
dent legal entities in China; and (6) Foreign exchange held by individuals.
Foreign Exchange Reforms, supra note 2, Part L
171. Id.
172. China Steps Up Efforts to Limit Access to Foreign Currency, UPI, Jan. 13, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File (Based on statement of Wang Qiren. president
of the Bank of China).
173. Foreign Exchange Reforms, supra note 2, Part I. As a transition mechanism, re-
tained foreign exchange and quotas uncommitted as of the date of reform could be con-
verted at the high official rate of December 31, 1993. New deposits into these accounts,
however, were prohibited. Id.
174. Kaye, supra note 150, at 81.
175. As an interim measure, domestic enterprises have been allowed to keep "record
keeping accounts" which allow firms direct access of up to 50% of the foreign exchange
deposited with the proper documents. Foreign Exchange Reforms, supra note 2, Part I.
This eliminates the risk of the currency depreciating in the future. The remaining 50%
must be surrendered in exchange for renminbi. Id. One senior economist has described
this situation as "double risk." First, the domestic firm loses 50% of its foreign exchange
immediately upon surrender, and must then purchase foreign exchange later (at a possibly
higher exchange rate) with renminbi; second, it is uncertain when PRC policy changes
might force the enterprises to surrender the other 50% in the desk account (record keeping
account). Interview with Guocang Huan, supra note 167.
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b. Gaining Access
In place of the retention system, the Foreign Exchange Reforms
institute a tightly controlled system for access to foreign exchange.1 76
To purchase foreign exchange for commercial payments, enterprises
must provide the domestic banks with verifiable documentation. Chi-
nese domestic enterprises, public institutions, government agencies,
and social organizations can get foreign exchange for these "external
payments under the current account" 177  with the following
documentation:
(1) Import quota, license, or other import authorization issued by
the departments concerned and relevant import contract for those
items subject to import quota or import restrictions;17 1
(2) Registration verification and relevant import contract for
those items subject to import voluntary registration;7 9°
(3) Import contract and notification for payment from overseas
financial institutions for all other import items than the above two
categories, which are in conformity with the State regulations;180 and
(4) Payment agreement or contract, and notification for payment
from overseas financial and non-financial institutions for commercial
payment under the non-trade account.18'
These requirements transfer control over the access of foreign ex-
change for commercial payments from the SGAEC and regional
banks to China's trade ministry (the agency in charge of import regis-
tration and contract approval). This change in authority arguably re-
flects the PRC's concerns over capital flight and frivolous imports.
The procedures for accessing foreign exchange for non-commercial
payments have not changed." s
176. Foreign Exchange Reforms, supra note 2, Part II (entitled "To implement the sys-
tem of purchasing foreign exchange from the banks and make the renminbi conditionally
convertible under the current account").
177. 1&
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Foreign Exchange Reforms, supra note 2, Part II. That section reads:
Purchase of foreign exchange for non-commercial payments or for withdrawal of
foreign currency in cash shall be proceeded in accordance with the relevant regu-
lations on financial and foreign exchange control. The authorization procedures
shall continue to be in effect for foreign exchange remittance for making overseas
investment, lending, and donations.
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The commercial access requirements will also end the power of
certain state owned enterprises to manipulate the foreign exchange
market.' Although the PRC professes to have weaned most of its
state owned enterprises off the official rate (and into the swap mar-
kets),184 some unaffected enterprises could still sell their foreign ex-
change to smaller domestic entities at a profit, acting as "money
changers."'" Many enterprises sat legally and illegally on accumula-
tions of foreign exchange, in expectation of another yuan devalua-
tion.' 86 As mentioned above, because they were allowed to buy
foreign exchange at the official rate and then rely on this rate to buy
necessary raw materials at discount prices, these firms also had a sub-
sidy of nearly thirty percent compared to firms tied to the swap
market. 187
With the new reforms, the government can, in theory, fully con-
trol the flow of foreign exchange both in and out of China and prevent
uneven distribution to certain provinces.118 The reforms in control
over domestic firm access to foreign exchange have played a major
part in increasing China's foreign exchange reserves. 8 9 However, the
reforms may also precipitate more foreign exchange outflows as "false
foreign ventures" 90 increase when companies try to lower the risks of
183. Yu Juan, supra note 110, at 26.
184. See Kaye, supra note 150, at 81:
Among the minority of trading at the fixed rate was the USS300 million worth of
FEC, as well as an unspecified amount of state-enterprise entitlements to buy
foreign exchange at the preferred rate from the BOC [Bank of China]. Nearly
two-thirds of those entitlements were withdrawn by government fiat last July
[1993].
185. Id.
186. Andrew Browne, China's Zhu Rongji Pledges Stable Exchange Rate, Reuter New-
swire, Aug. 4, 1993, available in WL, Int-News Database.
187. The difference between the prevailing swap rate before the change and the concur-
rent official rate.
188. Yu Juan, supra note 110, at 26 ("Beijing leaders hold that the new ruling can break
the hitherto uneven distribution of foreign currencies in China's 30 provinces and regions,
where certain places have surplus currencies while others in need of them do not.").
189. Carl Goldstein, Economic Monitor China, A Thousand Thanks, FAR E. EcoN.
REV., June 30, 1994, at 44 (comparing a rise from US$212 billion at the end 1993 with
US$27.2 billion on March 31, 1994); Andrew Browne, Abolition Of China Rate Leads to
Jump In Reserves, J. COM., Apr. 20, 1994, Front sec., at 2A (SGAEC official labels it
"biggest jump in history"). But see Goldstein, supra at 45 (Xiao Geng, an economics lec-
turer at the University of Hong Kong, cites credit restrictions issued the first quarter of
1994 as the impetus for increased reserves: "When enterprises couldn't get money from
the banks, they had to sell foreign exchange they'd been holding.").
190. See supra Part IILA.1.
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the surrender system by funneling some of the foreign exchange into
the "foreign" partner's account. 191
IV. Effects on Foreign Direct Investment
TWo prominent PRC officials have explicitly stated that the new
reforms will have no effect on the operation of foreign funded enter-
prises. 192 Although the directives of the Foreign Exchange Reforms
do not present new alternatives to the methods discussed in Part
II.B.3 for solving foreign exchange problems, the reforms will stream-
line administration of foreign invested enterprises. A negative impact
may be a loss of the flexibility found in the swap markets.
A. Impact on Administration
The set up and administration of foreign direct investment will be
easier, due to the abolition of the foreign exchange certificate (FEC)
and the discriminatory system of requiring foreign capital to be regis-
tered at the official rate. Without the obligatory FEC, accountants no
longer need to keep separate balance accounts of renminbi and FEC
purchases. Unfortunately, the PRC bypassed an opportunity to put
foreigners and Chinese on equal footing after the abolition of the for-
eign exchange certificate when it allowed government agencies to
raise the prices of the wages, rents, and other services that were for-
merly paid in FEC. 93
Accountants and negotiators should also welcome the devalua-
tion of the renminbi. Negotiators of Sino-foreign joint ventures previ-
ously had to bargain hard for increased valuation of foreign
contributions of technology and equipment because of the registration
191. For a discussion of these risks, see supra note 167.
192. The first individual is the Minister of MOFERT, Wu Yi. China: Foreign Trade
Minister on Foreign Exchange Reform and Its Impact on the Trade System, BBC MoNrroR-
ING SERVICE, Jan. 5, 1994, available in WL, Int-news Database ("the way to manage for-
eign exchange for foreign funded enterprises remains unchanged."). The second is the
vice-president of the People's Bank of China, Zhou Zhenqing. Foreign Exchange System
Unified in Move Towards a Convertible Currency, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROAD-
CAsTS, Dec. 31, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Bbcswb File ("[Clurrent foreign
exchange measures regarding foreign funded enterprises within our national boarders will
remain unchanged.").
193. Kathy Chen, Foreign Firms in China Oppose New Surcharges, VIALL ST. J., Feb. 7,
1994, at All ("Business groups representing hundreds of U.S., European and Asian com-
panies have sent letters to top Chinese leaders to protest what they describe as 'discrimina-
tory' 50 percent increases on phone rates, salaries of Chinese employees and other
charges.").
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of these items at the overvalued official rate.194 Accountants not only
had to keep track of these valuations, but in order to deal with the
1992 and 1993 depreciation of the renminbi, they had to translate it
back into hard currency in order to determine if there were earnings
or losses.195 This headache should also end, assuming the currency
remains stable. 96
Other expected benefits to the administration of foreign funded
enterprises in China are an expansion of foreign exchange liquidity
and an increase in the speed of foreign exchange transactions because
of the electronic interlink between centers. 97 Because of this, the re-
gional variation in exchange rates at swap centers should cease.'98
Foreign exchange can follow demand around the whole of China. 199
Another side benefit of the electronic linking should be increased
speed in the settlement of foreign exchange transactions.20
B. Possible Loss of Fleribility
On a negative note, should the PRC abandon the current policy
of allowing foreign funded ventures to use the swap markets and force
these firms to use the inter-bank system, the current flexibility the
swaps offer will be lost. Shortly after the reforms, before the inter-
bank system was established, it was reported that state bank branches
were already directed to limit Chinese enterprise's access to foreign
194. These negotiations used to be "dealbreakers" according to an American attorney
in China. Sender, supra note 11, at 64 (statement of David Ho of Baker & McKenzie). See
also Henny Sender, At Your Service: China's Lenders Remain Political Puppets, FAR E.
ECON. REv., Jul. 7,1994, at 62 ("[D]eals are easier to do now that the Chinese side can no
longer use an unrealistic exchange rate to inflate its contribution.").
195. Sender, supra note 11, at 65 ("IT]heir balance sheets may be denominated in
renminbi. But their footnotes, at least, will have to show the value of their assets and
earnings in hard currency.").
196. One financial expert has predicted a possible drop in the swap market rates.
Sender, supra note 194, at 62 (In light of low trading volumes on the swap markets, Huan
Guocang of J.P. Morgan in Hong Kong states that "if the government does not intervene,
the rate could drop to Rmb 9.5 or 10 [down from 8.7] to the dollar.").
197. Abolishing Swaps, supra note 155.
198. Id. For a discussion of the regional variations, see supra note 70 and accompany-
ing text.
199. Abolishing Swaps, supra note 154.
200. Id.
Although settlement will not always be immediate, companies should be able to
buy and sell currency more quickly. The overnight settlement system ought to
mean that even large orders can be met the day after they are placed. Last year
[1993] many companies waited one or two weeks for foreign exchange transac-
tions; some did not get them at all.
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exchange.20' Increased involvement by the central government in the
approval process for foreign funded firm access to foreign exchange,
as opposed to the more local swap centers, could mean tight imple-
mentation and monitoring of the balancing requirements discussed
above.2 °2 The government could, as it has promised with the state
enterprises, closely scrutinize the standing of foreign funded firms to
receive foreign exchange.2 3
The practice of flexible pricing, which some claim has proven to
be invaluable to certain foreign invested enterprises balancing their
foreign exchange, may also be hampered. Without retention quotas of
foreign exchange at their disposal, PRC state owned enterprises may
not be able to continue purchasing goods in China for foreign ex-
change. An unanswered question remains as to how firms that have
relied on this system will manage if it collapses.
C. A More Stable Renminbi
In the larger picture, the foreign exchange refonns could offer
foreign investors increased stability in the foreign exchange area. Im-
plemented as planned, the reforms could curb illegal capital flight (by
making it easier to track foreign exchange flows) and ensure that
more foreign exchange is accessible for production-oriented enter-
prises.2° The positive effect on the PRC's foreign exchange reserves,
201. Carl Goldstein, A Lighter Shade of Red, FAR E. ECON. REv, Apr. 28, 1994 at 79.
202. State Administration of Exchange Control officials have already been expressing
concerns over the loose treatment of some foreign invested enterprise,;. Stevenson-Yang,
supra note 165, at 4:
Yang Gonglin, SAEC director of policy and regulation, expressed concern that
some FIEs have not invested all their contracted capital, while others have failed
to meet export commitments in their contracts. He suggested that future breaches
of such standards would result in an FIE being denied permissicn to purchase
foreign currency. Yang also said, however, that a company meeting all its contrac-
tual provisions should face no barriers to buying hard currency.
See also Abolishing Swaps, supra note 155 ("It is possible, even probable, that the PBOC's
new [promised] regulations [designed to further implement the Foreign Exchange Re-
forms] will force banks to look more closely at companies' justification for foreign ex-
change orders than did swap centres. The banks may be asked to enforce foreign exchange
balancing requirements more strictly.").
203. Id. (speculating that "Companies, including-though they usually deny it-Ameri-
can and European ones, that used to enjoy special, queue-jumping relationships with swap
centres will lose them.").
204. See Brauchli, supra note 6, at A12:
Numbers recently released by the government suggest that its efforts may be de-
terring undesirable foreign investments .... [G]overnment-run media said the
number of new foreign-backed enterprises plunged 44%, or by 10,739 registra-
tions, in the first three months of 1994 from a year earlier.... [T]he China Daily
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which are an indicator of the stability of a country's currency, has al-
ready been witnessed.
V. Conclusion
In sum, the Foreign Exchange Reforms discussed in this article
represent a move by China to recentralize control over a most impor-
tant asset, money. The move was made in response to China's high
levels of legal and illegal capital outflows and China's wealthier re-
gions using their foreign exchange to ignore and evade dictates from
the central government. The government has designed the new con-
trols over foreign exchange to strictly regulate the access to hard cur-
rency. The creation of the inter-bank market will also allow the PRC
to oversee the value of the renminbi without the need for the buffer
currency known as the FEC.
Unfortunately, the PRC has still maintained its tight controls on
the ability of foreign funded enterprises to access foreign exchange.
The Foreign Exchange Reforms offer some help in this area, mainly
by ending the use of the former official rate in the negotiation and
administration of foreign funded firms. However, the benefit of sta-
bility in the exchange rate resulting from the reforms may be offset by
the loss of flexibility in access enjoyed at the swap markets.
newspaper said the drop in foreign-company registrations resulted mainly from a
decline in "bogus joint ventures." Analysts said such ventures probably include
companies most responsible for a boom in speculative real-estate investment and
luxury-automobile purchases.
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